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Abstract
This study aims to assess the impact of loan-to-value ceiling applied
by Resolution BCB No. 4,271 on the mortgage market in September 2013.
Based on public aggregated data, we assessed the effect of the regulatory
change on the loan-to-value and on quality of the portfolio using impact
evaluation techniques that aim to estimate true causal effects. Results
suggest the intervention did not reduce total mortgage loans. Interrupted
time series and differences-in-differences estimates show statistically sig-
nificant effects on the quality of the portfolio measured by the proportion
of poorly rated credits.
Keywords: loan-to-value ratio on the loan amount, real estate loans, difference-
in-differences, interrupted time series, synthetic control.
Resumo
O objetivo do presente estudo é avaliar o impacto do teto do valor do
empréstimo aplicado pela Resolução BCB 4.271 no mercado de hipotecas
em setembro de 2013. Com base em dados públicos agregados, avaliamos
o efeito da mudança regulatória no valor dos empréstimos e na qualidade
do portfólio usando técnicas de avaliação de impacto que buscam estimar
verdadeiros efeitos causais. Os resultados sugerem que a intervenção não
reduziu o total de empréstimos hipotecários. As estimativas de séries tem-
porais interrompidas e diferenças em diferenças mostram efeitos estatis-
ticamente significativos na qualidade da carteira, medida pela proporção
de créditos com classificação ruim.
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1 Introduction
This study aims to evaluate the effects of Resolution 4,271 from September
2013 enacted by Central Bank - of Brazil - which established the loan-to-value
ceiling on mortgages on total mortgage and quality of the portfolio. We use
public and aggregated data and adopt proper impact evaluation techniques
to estimate the causal effect of the intervention.
The housing bubble of 2008 strongly affected the housing market and
rapidly spread to different market segments, becoming a global financial cri-
sis. Since then, several policies were suggested to reduce vulnerabilities of the
financial system. On the housing market, the relationship between property
taxes and house prices is well documented. Thus property taxes are often
pointed as an effective policy to inhibit speculation and decrease prices (Bai
et al. 2014). On the financial markets, central banks, supervisory agencies and
multilateral organizations have also identified the need to improve the agents
regulation to avoid new crises and attenuate their impacts. Conventional su-
pervision, focusing on individual financial institutions revealed insufficient to
maintain the financial system stability. Macroprudential regulation, focused
on systemic risk and aimed at promoting economic and financial stability, has
become necessary to complement microprudential regulation1.
The real estate sector has received special attention by prudential regula-
tors because of its expansion and retraction cycles on the Brazilian real econ-
omy and financial system. Crowe et al. (2011) argue that the expansion cycle
of the real estate market may not affect macroeconomic stability, but how such
an expansion takes place does. The expansion financed by the excessive lever-
age of financial institutions have negative effects because, at the end of the
cycle, the impact of reduced real estate prices on the economy is amplified by
the financial effects from the deleveraging of lenders following the default by
borrowers.
Macroprudential policies control real estate booms and preserve quality
of credit portfolios. Reserve requirements, interbank exposure limits, loan-to-
value (LTV) and debt service-to-income (DTI) ratio ceiling imposition stands
out among the most used tools to implement these policies. Gete & Reher
(2016) argue that LTV limits can reduce cost to lenders, but also reduce bene-
fits of potential homeowners. The authors propose a mortgage market model
with LTV limits in which heterogeneous households can choose to rent or buy
real estate. Buying is only possible with mortgage loans. Mortgages can be
recourse or nonrecourse loans. Lenders must break even, and optimal LTV
must balance benefits of homeownership and costs and externalities of de-
faulting real estate mortgages. Optimal LTV produced in this model can help
policymakers to better tailor ceiling limits and reach more efficient results.
Kuttner & Shim (2016), based on data from57 countries over three decades,
investigate the effect of LTV adoption on prices in the housing market, find-
ing no significant effects of such policy. Wong et al. (2011), in turn, use a
panel of countries to evaluate the impacts of LTV ceiling imposition and con-
clude that the adoption of this policy reduced the sensitivity of default risks
to price shocks. Thus, the policy was effective in reducing the systemic risk
1Systemic risk is understood here as the probability of disruption in financial services when
the system is subjected to shocks despite meeting microprudential requirements (Silva et al.
2012).
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arising from housing market expansion and contraction cycles. However, it
had insignificant effect on the increase of real estate prices in the short term.
Lim et al. (2011) rely on a sample of 49 countries to evaluate the effect
of macroprudential policies and conclude that over 50% of countries reduced
credit growth and asset prices after enacting LTV ceilings. Regression anal-
ysis suggest the limits on LTV and DTI reduce the procyclicality of credit
instruments. Claessens et al. (2013) assess the effect of LTV and DTI ceilings
adoption on the balance sheets of 2,800 banks in 48 different countries and
conclude that the limits are effective in reducing the growth and leverage of
bank assets.
Morgan et al. (2018) analyze the effect of LTV changes on mortgage loans.
The authors use data of over 4,000 banks in 46 countries. This dataset makes
the study stand out from the others. The authors look at the effects of adopting
LTV, captured by the inclusion of a dummy for the ceiling adoption. The
results show a reduction of 5.9% in mortgage loans after LTV.
Two recent studies conducted in Brazil have evaluated the effect of macro-
prudential policies involving LTV regulation. Afanasieff et al. (2015) evalu-
ated the effect of the regulatory change implemented in December 2010 that
increased the risk associated with automobile credit operations with high LTV
and long maturities. Results suggest reduced default rates and total credit
amount confirming the expectations. Araujo et al. (2017) study the effects
of a LTV ceiling imposition to the real estate market on the behavior of bor-
rowers using different datasets and estimation strategies. They conclude that
the imposition of more conservative ceilings to the credit regulated segment
reduce both the payment delays and the mean value of loans.
Li & Yavas (2017) recommend LTV to be set individually. They argue that
the importance of the land value share on total property value has been ne-
glected as an important determinant of the default risk on mortgage markets.
According to the authors, the volatility of property prices results mostly from
the higher volatility of land prices. Testing test the effect of the land price
share to total property price on the risk of mortgage default, results show that
the higher the land price share to total property value, the higher the default
probability. Thus, the authors recommend that LTV should consider the land
value share to total property value of each mortgage loan applicant and that
it should be set individually.
The contributions of this paper to the literature are threefold. First, we
evaluate the application of an LTV ceiling and its effects on volume and qual-
ity of credit in a developing country facing rapid mortgage loans growth.
We use both country-level information to evaluate the effects of LTV on to-
tal loans, and local level credit information that allows comparing mortgage
loans of regulated and non-regulated sectors to assess impacts on the quality
of credit portfolio. In Brazil, the mortgage loans offered by private banks are,
for the most part, not subject to the Housing Financing System (SFH - Sistema
de Financiamento Habitacional) rules, public banks, in turn, are restricted
by the LTV limits on Resolution 4,271 from 2013. Second, since each coun-
try adopts different LTV limits, to collect as much evidence as possible on
the countries’ experiences is important. Third, we rely on impact evaluation
strategies that seek estimates of the true causal effect of the macroprudential
intervention.
To estimate the effect of the LTV intervention on the volume of credit we
use Synthetic Control methodology, with which we compared the Brazilian
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case study to various countries that did not adopt LTV ceilings during the
period. The results indicate that the credit did not decrease in response to LTV,
which might be good if accompanied by credit portfolio quality improvement.
In this sense, exploratory analysis using interrupted time series (ITS) sug-
gests an increase in the quality of the credit portfolio on aggregate. Analysis
with difference-in-differences (DID) confirms the result with more disaggre-
gated data. We use local level mortgage loans data for regulated and non-
regulated credit and find evidence that the quality of mortgage portfolio in-
creased among regulated sector, which were subject to the SFH rules and LTV
limits. A robustness test of previous parallel trends reinforce the causality of
the result.
This paper is divided into four sections in addition to this introduction.
Section 2 addresses the Institutional Framework, the rapid growth observed
in recent years and recent institutional changes. Section 3 describes the effects
of the LTV intervention on total mortgage loans. Section 4 describes the effects
on the quality of the portfolio. Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional Framework
After the debt crisis in the early 1980s, the Brazilian economy experienced a
period of strong macroeconomic instability and hyperinflation that worsened
the quality of the mortgage portfolio and led to the SFH crisis. Even after the
stabilization of the economy in the second half of the 1990s, which began with
the adoption of Plano Real in 1994, the recovery of real estate loans remained
inexpressive. The mortgage loans expansion only gained traction in the last
decade, particularly between 2009 and 2014.
The strong expansion in mortgage lending verified in Brazil during the
last decade is a result of favorable terms of trade, sustained growth, sound
fundamentals, legal reforms and facilitated financing conditions . The volume
of loans increased from 48.4 billion reais in December 2004 to 502.9 billion
reais in December 2014 2.
Two institutional changes that increased mortgage loans stand out: the im-
provement of legislation on patrimony of affectation and fiduciary alienation3
- which increased security to borrowers and lenders, and the renegotiation of
the housing debt of the Wage Variation Compensation Fund (FCVS), which
freed public resources to be channeled to mortgage market.
The housing program denominated Minha Casa, Minha Vida (MCMV -
My House, My Life, in Portuguese), launched after the 2008 crisis, was also
important for the credit growth. It aimed to reduce the housing deficit by
strengthening the participation of public banks. Figures 1 and 2 show the
rapid housing credit growth and how significant MCMV was in such an ex-
pansion. 4.
2Information retrieved from Central Bank Credit Information System (SCR). Prices are ad-
justed to values of June 2017.
3See Law 10,931 from August 2004, which sets guidelines for both taxation of patrimony of
affectation and fiduciary alienation.
4The program was made official by Law 11,977 on July 7th, 2009. Further information on
the MCMV Program can be found at http://www.cidades.gov.br/habitacao-cidades/
progrmas-e-acoes-snh/67-snh-secretaria-nacional/programas-e-acoes/
1297-programa-minha-casa-minha-vida.
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of the mortgage portfolio. Credits are classified
based on the ownership status of the financial institution - public or private - and on
operation type - at market rates or regulated rates. The portfolio of operations
contracted at market rates is denominated Real Estate Financing System (SFI –
Sistema de Financiamento Imobiliário) and the portfolio of operations contracted at
regulated rates is denominated Housing Financing System (SFH). The volume of the
portfolio is denominated in reais of June 2017.
Low-income families, with incomes up to 1,800 reais participated in level
1 of MCMV. Rather than loans granted by financial institutions, this level
receives subsidies. Resources from the Brazilian Severance Indemnity Fund
(FGTS Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço, in Portuguese) allowed expand-
ing the loans offered by MCMV at differentiated mortgage rates and payment
conditions focusing on middle-class families - with income between 4,000
and 7,000 reais - eligible for the program levels 2 and 3. Later in 2016, level
1.5 was created to attend families with incomes between 1,800 and 2,600
reais.
Mortgage loans grew rapidly in several countries of Latin America, with
Brazil standing out for presenting the highest housing credit growth rates
(Regional Economic Outlook Analytical Notes 2012). Experts, then, started to
question the soundness of the housing credit market and vulnerabilities that
could spread to the financial system and to the real economy (Otto 2015)5.
2.1 Housing Financing Resources in Brazil
The Brazilian housing financing system operates with two large complemen-
tary branches, i.e., the Housing Financing System (SFH) and the Real Estate
Financing System (SFI). SFH was launched by Law 4,380 from August 1964,
which aimed at reducing the housing deficit and at enabling a self-sustaining
5Even though default indicators such as the percentage of late payments longer than 90 days
presented historically-low levels.
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Notes: Figure shows the amount of credit offered by MCMV program levels 2 and 3.
The volume of credit is denominated in reais of June 2017.
Source: Brazilian Ministry of Cities.
fund raising and investment dynamics in the housing sector. On the other
hand, SFI was launched by Law 9,514 from November 1997, and aimed at
enabling real estate financing processes using market mechanisms.
SFH is characterized by regulating financing conditions such as interest
rates, maximum values for financed properties, maximum term and insur-
ance terms conditions, as established by the National Monetary Council. A
major share of SFH resources comes from the FGTS6 and the Brazilian Sav-
ings and Loans System (SBPE Sistema Brasileiro de Poupança e Empréstimos, in
Portuguese).
Resources resources from both FGTS and SBPE have compulsory origin.
The first consists of employer contributions, which aimed at protecting work-
ers in case they were fired and at providing funds for housing and sanitation.
SBPE funds consists of a compulsory share of total savings captured by SBPE
entities 7.
Recently, mortgage loans funding have changed, increasing participation
of FGTS and market sources. Nonetheless, resources from targeted savings
account for more than 50% of total resources 8.
Finally, despite the rapid credit growth observed in recent years, the Mort-
gage Loans/GDP ratio (8,5% in 2015, according to Financial Soundness Indi-
cators (FSI)/FMI) remains low at international levels, even in comparison to
6FGTS was established by Law 5,107 from September 1966
7According to Resolution 3,932 from December, 2010, 65% of the resources captured from
saving deposits by SBPE members should be directed to housing financing. At least 80% of
these 65% should be allocated to SFH operations, whereas the remainder should be allocated to
operations at market rates.
8For further details on the recent diversification in funding sources, see Otto (2015).
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other developing countries. The high concentration of mortgage loans in few
banks, and two public banks in particular is another feature of the Brazilian
mortgage market, as Figure 1 shows the strong dependence of the housing
loans segment on public banks and regulated rates operation types.
2.2 Regulatory Change: Resolution 4,271 from 2013
Resolution 4,271 from September 2013 imposed a limit on the amount to be
borrowed from SFH as a share of the real estate value. Before that Resolution,
Brazil LTV was unlimited, and only the amount to be borrowed was limited
(see Table 1). This measure was taken in a context in which many countries
were adopting such LTV ceiling policies as macroprudential tools to increase
banks resilience in economic downturns.
Table 1: Pre and post-reform LTV and loan limits







































Notes: (a) Based on Central Bank of Brazil Resolution 3,347, from February 8th, 2006. (b)
Based on Central Bank of Brazil Resolution 3,706, from March 27th, 2009. (c) Based on
Central Bank of Brazil Resolution 4,271 from of September 30th , 2013. (d)Based on
Central Bank of Brazil Resolution 4,676, of July 31th of 2018.
The idea behind the measure is that the greater the proportion of bor-
rower’s contribution from their own funds, the less incentive they must de-
fault if the economic conditions worsen and/or house prices negatively change.
The LTV ceiling imposed by the resolution is restricted to operations con-
tracted in compliance with SFH rules, i.e., to new loans contracted at reg-
ulated rates. The regulation is less rigorous in operations contracted with
Constant Amortization System (CAS) with a limit of 90%, in which install-
ments decrease in time and amortization is faster. Operations contracted with
the Amortization Schedule are more vulnerable to default in a property price
decline scenario, so it is subject to the more conservative maximum LTV of
80%. The resolution also update the maximum acceptable real estate value
to be financed within the SFH. The maximum value increased from 500,000
to 750,000 reais in the country’s richest states; and to 650,000 reais in other
federative units (see Table 1).
The impossibility of separating the effect of the imposition of LTV limits
from the limits update implies that the impact evaluation analyzed with ag-
326 Sá, Zoghbi and Terra Economia Aplicada, v.24, n.3
gregate data refers to the resolution.
3 Total Mortgage Loans after LTV: comparisonan International
Comparison
This section presents the macroeconomic effect of the LTV intervention in
September 2013 on the total amount of mortgage loans, taking a group of
countries as potential counterfactuals for Brazil. Using Synthetic Control
methodology allows the analysis of a homogeneous treatment, different from
using groups of countries with several and potentially different interventions
different LTV limits, and other confounding treatments adopted together with
LTV in each country. The methodology also permits to working with aggre-
gate data. It is often better to work with data as disaggregated as possible,
within the same country; but in this case, as far as the credit volume is con-
cerned, the imposition of LTV limits on regulated SFH credit can influence
non-regulated SFI credit. Working with aggregate data avoids effects of prob-
lems repercussion between regulated and non-regulated credit.
Developed by Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) the
Synthetic Control (SC) methodology consists in estimating the counterfactual
as a linear combination of the outcomes of untreated units similar to the








, t > T0, i , j (1)
where Y Iit is the treated unit outcome, Yjt are the outcomes of potential control
(donor) units and weights, w∗j are set to minimize the differences between pre-
intervention characteristics (Xi ) of treatment and control units.
We built a panel of 29 countries and 32 periods based on quarterly data
between the first quarter of 2007 and the last quarter of 2014 to enable the ap-
plication of the Synthetic Control methodology. The unavailability of longer
series for some countries is a limiting factor to the data collection prior to
2007. In addition, data after 2015 are excluded from the study to avoid con-
founders, such as housing credit policies implemented by the major real estate
credit provider in Brazil, Caixa Econômica Federal, in 2015.
Potential controls are selected based on studies by Martins et al. (2011)
and Cerutti et al. (2015). The donor pool was selected among countries that,
according to the study, did not implement macroprudential maximum LTV
policies. Data are collected from Central Banks, IMF (International Financial
Statistics/IFS and World Economic Outlook/WEO), World Bank (World De-
velopment Indicators), United Nations (UN) and from the EuropeanMortgage
Federation (EMF). Variables are described in Table 2.
Synthetic Control uses weights that produce a convex combination of coun-
tries that resembles Brazil the most (the synthetic Brazil). This resemblance
is defined in terms of a set of covariates X described in Table 2. X includes
the following set of macroeconomic variables 9: GDP growth (GDPVAR), GDP
per capita seasonally adjusted (GDP), International USD Reserves (RESERV),
Price Index (PI), Unemployment rate (UNEMPL), Quarterly GDP (quarterly
GDP), Private Consumption seasonally adjusted (Consumption), Real estate
9The set of variables is similar to that used by Cerutti et al. (2015)
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prices (PIMOV), Credit to the private sector except real estate loans (Credit),
Human Development Index (HDI), and Population (Pop). That procedure is
analogous to controlling for the same variables, with the advantage that it
does not assume linear relationship between control variables, LTV and mort-
gage loans. These variables are associated with the development of the credit
market as well as with the economy activity level.
We built a synthetic Brazil as a convex combination of countries in the
donor pool10. The characteristics of the nine selected predictors and lagged
dependent variables are very similar between Brazil and its synthetic counter-
part. The countries that compose synthetic Brazil are Australia, France, India,
Peru and Russia, with more weight given to the last one (see weights in Table
B.1). To order to evaluate the fit between synthetic and treated units in the
pre-treatment period, Abadie et al. (2014) suggest calculating the root mean















Adhikari & Alm (2016) suggested calculating the “Fit index” by normaliz-
ing the RMSPE to make the interpretation easier. Accordingly, the RMSPE of
















The closer to one the index, the worst the predictive power of the model.
On the other hand, the closer to zero, the better the fit. Table 3 presents
the RMSPE and the Fit Index of different pre-treatment periods. The indexes
suggest an appropriate fit for the 2010-2013 period.
Table 3: Model adjustment in the Pre-treatment Period for control units:
RMSPE and Fit index
2010Q1-2013Q3 2011Q1-2013Q3 2012Q1-2013Q3
RMSPE 0.15 0.029 0.017
RMSPE Benchmark 11.46 11.61 11.7
FIT Index 1.30% 0.25% 0.14%
Notes: Table shows the fit indicators for three pre-treatment periods.Fit index shows
values that suggest adequate adjustment for the three periods.
10Equation (9) in Appendix A determines optimal weights
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3.1 Synthetic Control results
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the log of mortgage loans in comparison to
its synthetic counterfactual, from the second quarter of 2011 to the end of the
fourth quarter of 2014. The difference between the two curves represents the
effect of the regulatory change implemented in September 2013. As expected,
mortgage loans relatively decrease between Brazil and synthetic Brazil in the
quarter immediately after the LTV intervention. Conversely, in subsequent
quarters mortgage loans increase increasing more in Brazil than in its syn-
thetic counterpart.
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Note: See donor country weights in Table B.1 in Appendix B.
Table 4: Twelve month growth rate in log real estate credit after LTV (in
USD)
∆T1 ∆T2 ∆T3 ∆T4 ∆T5
Treated 0.14 0.16 0.27 0.18 0.15
Synthetic 0.17 0.15 0.20 0.08 −0.17
Estimated Treatment Effect −0.03 0.01 0.07 0.09 0.32
Notes: Table shows the twelve-month variation in the log mortgage loans for the treated
and synthetic units- in percentage. Treatment effect is calculated based on the difference
between variations for treated and synthetic units in five quarters after the adoption of
the regulatory change.
Table 4 presents twelve-month growth rate in logmortgage loans for Brazil
and its synthetic part. It is based on variations for treated and synthetic units
(Figure 3) for five quarters after the adoption of the LTV. Results suggests the
mortgage loans growth rate is higher for Brazil compared with its synthetic in
second to fifth quarters after the intervention.
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We identified that the government, with Resolution 4,271 from2013, raised
the maximum acceptable mortgage loan at the same time as the LTV. Both
measures have opposite effects, which makes the Resolution final effect am-
biguous. This explains the lack of distinguishable effect on total mortgage
loans using Synthetic Control. In conclusion, these estimates are lower bounds,
but important to guide future investigation that will find better ways to esti-
mate the causal effect of macroprudential policies such as LTV.
Analytical expressions for estimates confidence intervals do not exist. To
infer on the results Abadie et al. (2007) suggest running a series of placebo
regressions having each country in the donor pool as the treated unit. Figure
4 presents the results of such estimates. It is basically equal to Figure 3, but
instead of the logarithm of credit as dependent variable, each line represents
the difference between the logarithm of credit of a treated unit and its syn-
thetic counterpart. The closer to zero that line, the better the adjustment of
the model, and since models use pre-intervention characteristics to obtain the
weights of each country, the models adjustments are naturally better in the
pre-intervention period. If LTV intervention in Brazil was binding we would
expect the difference to be the most negative if Brazil was the treated unit,
bellow all other potential treated units. However, Figure 4 shows a difference
similar to other potential treated units after LTV imposition in Brazil. Thus,
the result in terms of credit growth is inconclusive.










2011q2 2012q3 2013q4 2015q1
Notes: Each line represents the difference between the logarithm of credit of a treated
unit and its synthetic counterpart. The closer to zero that line, the better the
adjustment of the model, and since models use pre-intervention characteristics to
obtain the weights of each country, the models adjustments are naturally better in the
pre-intervention period. If LTV intervention in Brazil was binding we would expect
the difference to be the most negative if Brazil was the treated unit, bellow all other
potential treated units. However, Figure 4 shows a difference similar to other
potential treated units after LTV imposition in Brazil. Thus, the result in terms of
credit growth is inconclusive.
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Abadie et al. (2014) suggest computing the ratio between post and pre-
intervention RMSPE for each unit to assess how effective the strength of the
treatment is. Although we cannot make traditional statistical inference with
this estimator, the authors suggest that counting the number of units that
present higher ratios than the one that was actually treated may be effective
to determine the intervention effect. Ideally, 0% of the observations should
present higher ratios than the treated unit. Figure 5 summarizes the ratio
between RMSPE post and pre-intervention. Countries in Figure 5 are dis-
placed in alphabetical order in the x-axis, whereas the ratio of post RMSPE to
pre-RMSPE is displaced in the y-axis. Since Brazil is the only country in our
database that set LTV limits in the mortgage market during the period, we ex-
pected it to present the highest ratio. However, 6 out of 24 donors present the
post/pre-treatment relation higher than Brazil’s, thus indicating that a ran-
dom country would have a 25% probability of presenting post/pre-treatment
relation as high as Brazil’s—an insufficient outcome to infer treatment signif-
icance.
Figure 5: Post/Pre-RMSPE (root mean square prediction error) relation























0 10 20 30
Country
Notes: Figure 5 summarizes the ratio between RMSPE post and pre-intervention.
Countries in Figure 5 are displaced in alphabetical order in the x-axis, whereas the
ratio of post RMSPE to pre-RMSPE is displaced in the y-axis. Since Brazil is the only
country in our database that set LTV limits in the mortgage market during the period,
we expected it to present the highest ratio. However, 6 out of 24 donors present the
post/pre-treatment relation higher than Brazil’s, thus indicating that a random
country would have a 25% probability of presenting post/pre-treatment relation as
high Brazil’s an insufficient outcome to infer treatment significance.
4 Mortgage Portfolio Quality after LTV
Results in Section 3.1 suggest the difference in total real estate credit between
Brazil and its synthetic part is equal to zero. That result would follow if the
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LTV limit was not binding. In fact, if the LTV limit was not binding the credit
portfolio quality would not improve. This section conducts a test of LTV effect
on a measure of the quality of mortgage portfolio.









mar/13 30.47 284.62 31.75 0.42
jun/13 30.91 305.57 35.26 2.94
sep/13 32.39 325.77 38.10 3.60
dec/13 34.18 344.24 35.06 3.74
mar/14 35.69 330.11 36.46 29.72
jun/14 37.26 343.34 38.27 32.71
Notes: Table shows total mortgage portfolio based on the ownership status
of the institution, public or private and on the type of loans
regulated/subsidized (SFH) or non-regulated/market-rate (SFI). The volume
of the portfolio is expressed in billions of reais. Prices are constant to values
of June 2017.
Table 5 public banks are important in the mortgage market. SFH credit
given by public banks amounted to over 82% of total loans in March 2013.
That decreased to 76% in June 2014. SFH loans by public banks increased
from 284.62 billion reais in March 2013 to 344.24 billion reais in December
same year. In the following quarters, SFH loans remained relatively stable.
SFI loans by public banks, on the other hand, increased significantly, from
0.42 billion in March 2013 to 32.71 billion in June 2014.
Central Bank of Brazil uses letters to classify the operations according to
Resolution 2,682 from of 199911. Standard risk operations, i.e., the ones with
delay of up to 60 days, are classified in descending order of risk as AA, A, B
and C. Credit is considered progressively more problematic from categories
D to H. Variable Yit denotes the proportion of problematic credit on total
portfolio.
Y =
(Portf olios D +E + F +G +H)
(Portf olios AA+A+B+C +D +E + F +G +H)
× 100 (5)
We used data on mortgage loans registered in the Central Bank of Brazil
Credit Information System Central Bank of Brazil. According to the database,
all loans by financial institutions at values higher than a thousand reais are
recorded and classified based on their risk level.
Figure 6 describes the proportion of non-performing mortgage loans dur-
ing the period immediately before and after the LTV imposition in Septem-
ber 2013. It is based on the quality index in equation (5). The figure shows
that the proportion of credit considered problematic is very low, around 5%
for SFH - regulated/subsidized - and 2% for SFI - non-regulated/market-rate.
Besides, right after LTV enactment, the quality indicator among SFI credit
deteriorated slightly more.
Figure 7 shows an exploratory exercise with the proportion of problem-
atic mortgage loans on total portfolio (classified D and higher, that is, with
11See also Relatório de estabilidade financeira by Brazilian Central Bank (2017)
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Figure 6: Evolution of the portfolio quality between 2013 and 2015 by
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The figure describes the proportion of non-performing mortgage loans during the
period immediately before and after the LTV imposition in September 2013.
Non-performing mortgage loans are defined based on the quality index in Equation
(5): Yit =
Portf olios D+E+F+G+H
Portf olios AA+A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H ×100
Source: Credit Information System Central Bank of Brazil.
payments delayed for more than 90 days) before and after LTV using inter-
rupted time series12. This is a type of regression discontinuity, in which time
is the treatment assignment variable (forcing variable). For such a methodol-
ogy to work properly we need high frequency data and the effects after LTV
enactment to be instantaneous. Nevertheless, neither condition is met in this
exercise. We have few degrees of freedom, and effects of LTV may take a long
time to be noticed. Thus, Figure 7 should work only as an auxiliary exercise.
We could also have added control variables that may confound the results
in Figure 7, but few macroeconomic variables present with quarterly infor-
mation, and even using some of these variables as controls, we still have few
degrees of freedom. Still, this figure offers good insights. Adjusting a flexible
polynomial on both sides of the intervention threshold, we find an immediate
decrease in problematic loans of 0.37 percentage points (pp.). The decrease re-
mains throughout the period under analysis, with a total reduction of almost
1 pp. after 15 months. Such a reduction is not negligible, once we are mea-
suring the quality of the entire portfolio a stock variable and that problematic
loans for SFH and SFI amount to less than 5% of the total.
Difference-in-differences (DID) is another strategy used to evaluate the ef-
fect of LTV on credit portfolio quality. We used data on SFH and SFI mort-
gage loans at the municipal level. Municipalities with few operations were
excluded from the database so not to compromise their confidentiality. Mu-
nicipalities with unbalanced SFH and SFI portfolios were also excluded. The
12This design is often applied to evaluate regulatory changes in financial markets, and health
policies with immediate effects (Abe 2016).
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Figure 7: Adjusting an interrupted time series (ITS) to explain total mort-
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Notes:This figure shows a parametric exercise that allows us to figure possible
discontinuous effects produced by the LTV ceiling. We adjust a flexible polynomial











t2t , where Xt is a dummy indicating
the periods before (equal to 0) and after LTV enactment; tt is a time trend and Yt the
proportion of loans classified as D or higher on total mortgage loans. The figure shows
an immediate decrease of 0.37 percentage points (pp.) in problematic credit. The
decrease remains throughout the period under analysis, with a total reduction of
almost 1 pp. after 15 months. Such a reduction is not negligible, once we are
measuring the quality of the entire portfolio a stock variable and that problematic
credits for SFH and SFI amount to less than 5% of total credit.
Source: Financial Stability Reports (Banco Central do Brasil, 2017).
estimation strategy consists in exploring a group affected by the regulatory
change (SFH) - treated group - and another group not subjected to that change
(SFI) - control group. DID design rely on the hypothesis treated and control
groups would follow parallel tendencies in the absence of treatment. Treat-
ment effect is given by the difference between treatment and control groups of
the variations before and after the intervention. DID model can be expressed
by:
Yit = α + βTt +γDi +θTtDi + εit (6)
Yit denotes the proportion of mortgage loans classified as D or higher on
total loans; Tt is a dummy denoting time (equal to 0 before and to 1 after
LTV enactment); Di denotes eligibility to treatment, equal to 1 for total SFH
portfolio and 0 for total SFI portfolio in each municipality; and interaction
(TtDi ) shows effective treatment situation. The treatment effect is given by θ.
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4.1 DID results
Estimates with data from loans of SFH and SFI by municipalities are pre-
sented in Table 6. The estimation strategy consists in exploring a group af-
fected by the regulatory change (SFH) treated group and another group not
subjected to that change (SFI) control group. Figure 6 also describes the
dataset. We do not need to control for macroeconomic confounding factors
in this case, because they are common to all municipalities, and are thus cap-
tured by the time dummy. Table 6 summarizes treatment effect for 6 and
12 months after treatment. The DID estimator shows significant result after
6 months. It shows that after treatment, mortgage portfolio quality of SFH
loans improved 0.66 percentage points in relation to SFI loans. The magni-
tude of the treatment effect cannot be neglected, since the quality of new loans
affected by the treatment is diluted in total portfolio. The DID treatment ef-
fect on the quality of the portfolio corroborates that described by Araujo et al.
(2017).
Table 6: Difference-in-differences results onmortgage
portfolio quality











Notes: ∗: p < 0.10. ∗∗: p < 0.05. ∗∗∗: p < 0.01.
On the other hand, results show no significance after 12 months. That may
be the consequence of a higher deterioration in the non-regulated portfolio.
Borrowers may have migrated to non-regulated SFI loans with higher inter-
est rates. Cizel et al. (2016) investigate the effect of replacing the regulated
sector (bank credit) with the non-regulated one (non-bank credit) in an em-
pirical study based on data from 40 countries. According to their study, the
regulated mortgage market decreased 10% in the two years after the imple-
mentation of macroprudential policies; whereas the non-regulated segment
showed increased growth rate of 5%. Total mortgage loans declined 8%, thus
indicating the growth in the non-regulated sector did not compensate for the
decline in the regulated sector. The study concludes an effect of substitution
from the regulated sector with the non-regulated one, indicating worsening
in the risk classification of the non-regulated sector.
Table 7 shows the robustness test of parallel trends between treatment
and control groups in the pre-treatment period. Results show no significant
differences in pre-treatment trends, which indicates the results at 6 months
after LTV intervention is not the result of a pre-existing trend.
Figure 8 shows parallel treatment and control trends of mortgage portfo-
lio quality in the period of 6 months before the LTV enactment. Such a result
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Notes: ∗: p < 0.10. ∗∗: p < 0.05. ∗∗∗: p < 0.01.
suggests the statistical significance of the effect of the LTV enactment on mort-
gage portfolio quality was not due to previous trend differences.
Figure 8: Estimates of the mortgage portfolio quality before the LTV
enactment
Notes: This figure shows parallel trends of treatment and control groups in the period
of 6 months before the LTV enactment. Treatment group represents SFH loans,
affected by the regulation, in each municipality. Control group represents
non-regulated SFI loans in each municipality.
Figure 9 shows the proportion of non-performing mortgages for a long pe-
riod (from January 2004 to September 2013) before LTV enactment. Although
the quality levels of the SFH and SFI mortgage portfolios are different, the dy-
namics in the pre-treatment period is similar between the two groups. That
suggests no pre-existent trend differences, and the results in Table 6 may be
causal.
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Figure 9: The evolution of mortgage portfolio quality in the pre-















The figure shows the evolution of mortgage portfolio quality in the pre-intervention
period, from January 2004 to September 2013.
5 Final Remarks
This study evaluates the effect of the regulatory change that implemented
an LTV ceiling on mortgage loans growth dynamics and on the quality of
the mortgage portfolio. We explore aggregate datasets because Microdata on
credit operation are confidential. Nonetheless, this study shows it is feasible
to work with impact evaluation methodologies with aggregated or more dis-
aggregated data.
We begin focusing on the impact of the regulatory change on total mort-
gage loans using Synthetic Control, which avoids heterogeneous LTV inter-
ventions observed in country level panels. Results show the housing credit
growth dynamics was not affected by the LTV enactment in Brazil. Although
Lim et al. (2011) and Cizel et al. (2016) find decreasing mortgage loans after
LTV ceiling implementations, this effect is not observed in Brazil. Competing
hypothesis can explain this result. First, Brazilian LTV was not binding. Sec-
ond, LTV may be binding, but LTV reduced the perceive risk of financial in-
stitution, which increased credit supply in response, canceling out the credit
reduction by LTV enactment. Third, increases in the real estate maximum
financing value were adopted simultaneously with the LTV ceiling, also can-
celing out effects.
After that, we check the aggregated behavior of the mortgage portfolio
quality before and after the LTV introduction using interrupted time series,
observing a significant change in total quality of the portfolio regulated (SFH)
and non-regulated (SFI). This analysis allows us to observe general balance
effects of regulated and non-regulated mortgage portfolio quality.
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Results obtained through DID corroborated the study by Cizel et al. (2016)
and Araujo et al. (2017), since they show statistically significant effects of the
regulation on the quality of the regulated group (SFH) in comparison to the
non-regulated one (SFI) in the short run (6 months after treatment). In the
long run, the effect vanishes, which may be the result of substitution effect
between regulated and non-regulated loans, which influences DID estimates
but not ITS, which continues to show LTV significant effects after 12 months.
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Appendix A
Originally developed by Abadie &Gardeazabal (2003) andAbadie et al. (2010)
the Synthetic Control (SC) methodology has been widely adopted in compara-
tive evaluation studies for unique interventions performed at aggregate level.
Case studies - such as the LTV enactment - try to predict the evolution of an
aggregate outcome variable for the treated unit by comparing it to an average
of units - called Synthetic Control- that resembles the treated unit as much as
possible.
The standard model by Abadie et al. (2007) presents a single treated unit
i, which is exposed to treatment after period T0, i.e., during periods T0+1,T0+
2, ...,T , and J untreated units that are potential donors for the synthetic con-
trol. Taking Yit as the dependent variable, the estimated effect is the difference





it , t > T0 (7)
where Y Iit is the potential outcome if unit i was exposed to treatment and Y
N
it
is the potential outcome of unit i in period t in the absence of intervention.
Synthetic Control consists in estimating YNit as a linear combination of the








, t > T0, i , j (8)
The weights w∗j are set to minimize the differences between pre-intervention
characteristics of treatment and control units. Xi denotes a vector of covari-












w∗j = 1 (9)
j = 1, ..., J ;
i , j
where X0 contains covariates of units in the donor group; X1 is characteris-
tics of the treated unit; V is a diagonal matrix with non-negative components
that assign weights to the most important covariates in terms of prediction
accuracy. After finding the first choice V ∗, it is possible to choose W ∗ to mini-





can be obtained before and after intervention and then compared with the
outcome. Placebo tests with each observation are conducted to infer.
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Appendix B
Table B.1: Composition of the Synthetic Control (only countries
with positive weights)
Country Unit Weight
Australia 0.073
France 0.165
India 0.123
Peru 0.006
Russia 0.634
